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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
WIFE'S PURCHASE OF HUSBAND'S STOCK
IN FAMILY CORPORATION AT
INVOLUNTARY SALE HELD AN INTRA-
FAMILY TRANSFER
In Merritt v. Commissioner' the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit, relying upon section 267 of the Internal -Revenue
Code of 1954,2 disallowed the deduction of a loss sustained by a
taxpayer following an involuntary sale of stock in a family-owned
corporation to the taxpayer's wife. James H. Merritt, Sr., had
accumulated uncontested tax liabilities during 1944, 1945, and 1946
totaling $191,812.98 which were still outstanding in 1960. After
receipt of a notice of levy, he delivered his shares of the family-
owned wholesale plumbing corporation, having a basis of $135,000,
to the Internal Revenue Service. Merritt's "right, title, and
interest" in the seized stock was sold at public auction for $25,000
to the only bidder, his wife, Amanda Merritt. On their joint return
for 1960 the Merritts reported a long-term capital loss amounting
to $110,000 and applied $10,187.49 thereof to offset capital gains
and other income for 1960. The Commissioner disallowed all
deductions, ruling that the loss resulted from an intrafamily
transfer and consequently was not deductible under section 267.
The Tax Court found for the Commissioner,' and the Fifth Circuit
affirmed.
'400 F.2d 417 (5th Cir. 1968).
2 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954. § 267:
-(a) Deductions disallowed. -No deduction shall be allowed-(l) Losses. In respect of
losses from sales or exchanges of property.(other than losses in cases of distributions in
corporate liquidations), directly or indirectly, between persons specified within any one of the
paragraphs of subsection (b)....
"(b) Relationships.-The persons referred to in subsection (a) are: (I) Members of a
family, as defined in subsection (c)(4); ...
"(c) Constructive Ownership of Stock.-For purposes of determining, in applying
subsection (b), the ownership of stock-
(4) The family of an individual shall include only his brothers and sisters (whether by the
whole or half blood). spouse, ancestors, and lineal descendants; ....
Merritt v. Commissioner, 47 T.C. 519 (1967).
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Section 267 is the expanded successor of section 24 of the 1934
Internal Revenue Act, which represented Congress' initial attempt
to eliminate a Depression-born wave of tax evasion resulting from
deductions created by transactions between related parties which
did not give rise to an actual economic loss.' Prior to 1934
deductions were allowed for all losses incurred during bona fide
property transfers, regardless of the relationship between vendor
and vendee.6 However, the difficulty of distinguishing good faith
sales from sham transactions when related parties were involved led
to the enactment of section 24 whereby deductions for any loss
resulting from a direct or indirect transfer between clearly-defined
related parties were disallowed. 7 Originally this restriction covered
sales or exchanges of property between the taxpayer and his family
or between the taxpayer and a corporation in which he or his
family owned more than 50 percent of the stock; "family" was
defined as brothers, sisters, spouse, ancestors and lineal
descendants.! The 1936 revenue legislation extended the ban to
certain transfers among grantors, fiduciaries, and beneficiaries, and
beneficiaries of the same trust.9 Despite the limited scope of the
restrictions'" and the freedom to make evasive joint-tenancy
grants," the legislation was fairly effective because the courts
'See Act of May 10, 1934, ch. 277, § 24, 48 Stat. 680 (now INT. REV. CODE OF
1954, § 267).
See Reilly. 4 n Approach to the Sinplification and Standardization of the Concepts -The
namil*. .. *Related Parties." "Control." and "'Attribution of Ownership." 15 TAX L. REV.
253 (1960): 78 CoNc,. Ri-c. 2662 (1934) (remarks of Rep. Hill, Chairman of House
Subcomm. on income tax laws).
"See Commissioner v. Behan, 90 F.2d 609 (2d Cir. 1937) (seller must divest himslf of all
title and control); Zimmermann v. Commissioner, 36 B.T.A. 279 (1937), rev'd on other
grounds. 100 F.2d 1023 (3d Cir. 1939) (securities losses in interspousal sales through broker
at market prices held deductible), Twining v. Commissioner, 32 B.T.A. 600 (1935) (sale must
be for a fair market price).
'See Hertz, Dealing with Related Persons: Salaries and Other Compensation; Sales of
Property; Interest Accruals and Other Deductions. 23 INSTITUTE ON FED. TAXATION 577,
579 (1965); 33 'A. L. REV. 95, 96 (1947).
'See note 4 supra.
'Act of June 22, 1936, ch. 690, § 24(b)(1)(D)(E)(F), 49 Stat. 1648 (now INT. REV. CODE
OF 1954, § 267).
''See Hanna's Estate v. Commissioner. 320 F.2d 54 (6th Cir. 1963) (loss allowed'on sale
of stock by estate to corporation it controlled); Reilly, supra note 5, at 280, 281.
"See Stapleton, Losses Between Related Taxpayers Under Section 24(b), 31 TAXES 902
(1953). See also. e.g.. Stern v. Commissioner, 215 F.2d 701 (3d Cir. 1954) (where taxpayer
sold realty to his son-in-law and taxpayer's daughter supplied no part of consideration but
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retained the flexibility of their pre-1934 approach and continued to
look to the economic realities of an entire transaction. Thus, a loss
deduction was disallowed whenever "control" was maintained by
the transferor despite a clearly legal sale to a party not statutorily
classified as related. 2
With the statute disallowing the loss on sales among particular
parties and the courts requiring a cessation of economic control in
each sale before a loss could be deducted, it was inevitable that the
legal discussion should focus on what constitutes a "sale," direct or
indirect.3 In Commissioner v. Ickelheimer,'4 where a husband
acting under a power of attorney sold his wife's bonds on a public
exchange and subsequently, without prearrangement, repurchased a
like number of the same bonds as trustee of a trust in which his
wife was beneficiary, the transfer was held to be an arms-length
transaction rather than an "indirect sale" between fiduciary and
beneficiary, and the loss deduction" was allowed. Yet, in
Commissioner v. Kohn'5 and Commissioner v. McWilliams,"6
interspousal stock transfers made for the avowed purpose of
establishing tax benefits, although likewise passing through public
brokers, were held to be indirect sales not giving rise to loss
deductions. In each of the three cases the taxpayer had sold
securities on the open market, and the spouse had made roughly
similar purchases at approximately the same time, but in only two
of the cases was the transaction held to constitute an "indirect
sale." In Mc Williams v. Commissioner'7 the Supreme Court
resolved this conflict by characterizing section 24 as an "absolute
became tenant by the entirety under Pennsylvania law as result of direction of taxpayer's son-
in-law that she be included in deed of conveyance, taxpayer's daughter did not become
purchaser of such realty so as to bring taxpayer within provision of Code prohibiting
deduction in respect to losses between members of family, so that loss was deductible).
'"See Higgins v. Smith, 308 U.S. 473 (1940); Boehm v. Commissioner, 255 F.2d 684 (2d
Cir. 1958) (sale and repurchase between wife and father-in-law); Bank of America Nat'l
Trust and Savings Ass'n v. Commissioner, 15 T.C. 544 (1950), afj'd per curiant, 193 F.2d
178 (9th Cir. 1951) (reacquisition agreement); Crown Cork Int'l Corp. v. Commissioner, 4
T.C. 19 (1944), affd per curianz, 149 F.2d 968 (3d Cir. 1945) (no substantial economic
effect).
'See National Metropolitan Bank v. United States, IIl F. Supp. 422 (Ct. Cl. 1953):
Moore, When Is a Sale Not a Sale? 25 TAXES 326 (1947).
1 132 F.2d 660 (2d Cir. 1943).
" 158 F.2d 32 (4th Cir. 1946).
" 158 F.2d 637 (6th Cir. 1946), affd, 331 U.S. 694 (1947).
"331 U.S. 694 (1947).
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prohibition-not a presumption" "-against allowing losses for
sales within certain groups and by deciding that indirect sales
should not be interpreted so narrowly as to leave a loophole almost
as large as section 24 had set out to close. 9 After Mc Williams had
been argued in the Supreme Court, but before the opinion was
promulgated, the Tax Court decided in Zacek v. Commissionera'
that the attempted deduction by a mortgagor for his bona fide loss
on a foreclosure sale of the mortgaged property to relatives should
be disallowed because the concept of indirect sale was
comprehensive enough to include even an invohtarv sale.2 '
Although Mc Williams called for a broad interpretation of "indirect
sale,"22 it made no specific reference to the issue of involuntary action.
The Court merely identified section 24 as an attempt to block those
who "choose . . . their own time for realizing tax losses,"23 as the
petitioner in McWilliams had so patently done. Some courts
therefore limited McWilliams to voluntary sales, direct or indirect,
where the parties had attempted to "choose their own time," and
allowed deductions for losses resulting from involuntary transfers
of property where possible tax benefits were clearly not the impetus.
In McCartv v. Cripe,:' where the taxpayer's farm was sold for
taxes at a public sale to a trustee using funds supplied by the
taxpayer himself, and the trustee immediately conveyed the farm to
a corporation in which the taxpayer owned more than fifty percent
of the stock, it was held that the transaction was not a sale directly
or indirectly between the taxpayer and his controlled corporation
because he had not been able to choose his own time for realizing
the tax loss. Therefore, the deduction was allowed. 25 In McNeill v.
Commissioner, 2 6 where the taxpayer's property was sold for taxes
directly to a corporation in which the taxpayer and his family
owned all the stock, the taxpayer was not precluded from deducting
the loss since the sale was occasioned by the separate and
Id. at 699.
'Id. at 700, 701.
-'8 T.C. 1056 (1947).
Id. at 1057.
See note 17 supra.
23331 U.S. at 700.
24 201 F.2d 679 (7th Cir. 1953).
' d. at 682.
:°251 F.2d 863 (4th Cir. 1958), cert. denied. 358 U.S. 825 (1958).
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independent action of the public authorities which eliminated any
choice in selecting the time for realizing the loss. 7 Merritt
represents an attempt to revitalize McWilliams and proposes that
all transactions between the parties specified in section 267 be
denied the privilege of loss deductions without regard to volition.
In Merritt v. Commissioner the Tax Court divided sharply on
the meaning of section 267.8 The majority rejected any
consideration of the absence of sham or prearrangement, looking
only to the fact that the wife was the ultimate recipient of the
property. The concurring opinion disallowed the loss because of the
near identity of the economic interests before and after the transfer.
The dissent stoutly maintained that section 267 was intended to
reach only wilful manipulators. On appeal the Fifth Circuit,
disregarding such distinctions, concluded that the only
consideration is whether property has been received by one who
satisfied the statutory definition of "related party," regardless of
whether there has been an active attempt at tax evasion.29 Quoting
extensively from Mc Williams' discussion of section 24. the court
indicated that section 267 is likewise an absolute prohibition
against the allowance of losses on all sales between parties in
certain designated groups and that its purpose should not be
aborted by introducing the "niceties of either sequence of title or
voluntary versus involuntary sales."3 The purpose of the legislation
was and is "to put an end to the right of taxpayers to choose, by
intra-family transfers and other designated devices, their own time
for realizing tax losses. . . ."' The court did note the more
traditional issues of identity of interest and, continuous control of
the stock 2 but concluded that, for the sake of simplicity, section
267 should result in denial of all deductions for losses incurred
during transfers between forbidden parties whether voluntary or
not.33
Two circuits have allowed deductions for losses resulting from
forced sales to related parties, when it was clear that the sale was
2, id. at 866.
-. 47 T.C. 519 (1967).
29400 F.2d 417 (5th Cir. 1968).
Id. at 420.
Id.. quoting McWilliams v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 694. 700 (1946).
3!Id. at 421.
"Id.
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not prearranged for tax purposes" and when an actual economic
loss was suffered.35 The Merritt case now holds that deductions for
losses from sales among related parties should be disallowed
without exception whether voluntary or not. Yet that court felt
compelled to buttress its categorical announcement by reference to
the "continuous control" and "identity of interest" '  which
characterized and vitiated the earlier McWilliams opinion. The
extensive reliance on Mc Williams seemed more to emphasize the
need to block scheming tax dodgers who "choose their own
time"-in the instant case perhaps by a conscious decision to
ignore taxes and force a foreclosure3 -than to ground the decision
upon an absolute rule that the deduction is to be disallowed
whenever a related party obtains the property regardless of
surrounding circumstances. Thus, it is arguable that the thrust of
the Fifth Circuit opinion disallowed Merritt his deduction not
because of the existence of an "absolute rule," but because of a
manifest continuity of control and identity of interest which
precluded his suffering a real loss to the extent of $1 10,000. Indeed,
it is this very situation which the statute was designed to cover. 8
Thus, the articulated rule of Merritt in its absolute form would
seem an unnecessarily broad basis for the holding, and its
indiscriminate application to transfers among related parties where
there is complete transfer of control accompanied by actual
economic loss would be unwarranted. While the Merritt rule offers
uniformity and ease of application, it completely ignores the fact
that sales to related parties are often made for reasons other than
tax evasion.3 9 Where an involuntary sale involves several
competitive bidders or results in a fair market price, the loss should
be allowed.4" The decisions of the Fourth and Seventh Circuits have
always looked to the substance rather than the form of intrafamily
See note 17 supra.
"See note 23 supra.
See note 28 supra.
"See Stapleton, supra note 1I, at 904-05. But cf Hamovit, Disallowance of Losses and
Deductions and Characterization of Gains Between Related Persons. 15 W. RES. L. REV.
270, 275 (1964).
" See note 5 supra.
" Comment, Nondeductible Capital Losses and Bona Fide Sales Under the Federal
Income Tax, 49 YALE L.J. 75, 78 (1939).
41 R. MONTGOMERY, FEDERAL INCOME TAX HANDBOOK 1938-39, at 461 (1938); Anthoine,
Transaction.s Between Related Taxpayers. 1956 TULANE TAX INSTITUTE 269, 277.
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transactions when allowing loss deductions under section 267. The
flexibility offered by those circuits should not be eliminated. The
Merritt transaction would not qualify for a deduction under the
McNeill and McCartv theory, but it should not become the
vehicle for precluding such relief in future cases arising under more
compelling factual circumstances. The position of the McNeill and
McCarty courts has a significant equitable basis; in effect, they
treat section 267 as a rebuttab le presumption." A blanket
elimination of the flexible concept of "involuntary sale" by any
explicit affirmation of Merritt would be unfortunate; legislative
intent and justice would be lost in the rush to replace adaptability
with simplicity.
"See Gilliam, Some EJfects of Nonrecognized Losses on Corporationsi and Their
Shareholders. 35 N.C.L. REv. 31. 59-60 (1956).
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